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2ABSTRACT FOR
MISPLACED ANGST: ANOTHER LOOK AT CONSENT-SEARCH JURISPRUDENCE.
Conventional scholarship misunderstands the judicial invocation of voluntariness when 
evaluating a purported consensual search.  The key is to nail down more precisely what we mean 
by the term, consent.  Most commentators mistakenly entwine consent and waiver, wrongly 
treating the act of consenting (to a search, to questioning, etc.) as an instance where the actor is 
waiving a constitutional right.  That conceptual error promotes the view that consent refers to a 
subjective condition, a psychological state, which, in turn, spurs the expectation that 
voluntariness refers to a person=s inner experience.  On this view of consent, the person=s inner 
experience is what gives consent its moral force.  From this conceptual framework, the Supreme 
Court=s consent-search jurisprudence is, indeed, a mess (and hence, angst-producing).  
I explicate another conceptualization of consent, one that understands it to be an act, a 
speech-act which must be evaluated in terms of how we envision police-civilian encounters 
ought to occur.  Voluntariness, then, is more a statement of approbation than a concept with its 
own substantive content.  No one can be satisfied with the Court=s consent-search jurisprudence 
with the expectation that voluntariness actually means more than that.  But once we understand 
the Court to be pursuing a normative vision of what we will and will not tolerate in the cat-and-
mouse game of crime fighting, we can appropriately and meaningfully critique its decisions.  
And so, if we are to have angst over the Court=s decisions concerning consent searchesCand there 
may well be good reasons for itCthe angst will arise not from metaphysical quarrels over what is 
voluntary and what is not, but from what the Court is willing to accept by way of police 
methodology.
Clarifying our terminology and modulating our expectations of what we mean to say 
when we use metaphysically laden terms sharpens our ability to critique the arguments of others. 
 This article shows this to be true when it comes to critiquing the Supreme Court=s consent-
search jurisprudence.
3MISPLACED ANGST:
ANOTHER LOOK AT CONSENT-SEARCH JURISPRUDENCE
No one has a good word to say about consent-search jurisprudence.  At least so it seems.1
Consent searches, the most common type of warrantless searches law-enforcement officers 
conduct, are understood to be constitutional so long as the permission to search is Afreely given 
and voluntary.@2  In fact, the Supreme Court applauds these grants of permission, not only 
because they facilitate crime-fighting,3 but also because they supposedly bespeak the law=s 
valorization of autonomy.4 Consent is a Amaster concept@ in our culture, a concept that captures 
the moral grounding of our entire way of thinking about human action.5  We associate with 
1Attacks on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally is, of course, nothing new.  See Silas Wasserstrom 
& Lous Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 19 (1988) (AAlmost no 
one has a kind word to say about fourth amendment jurisprudence.@).  Nonetheless, six members of the Supreme 
CourtCKennedy, Rehnquist, O=Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and BreyerCthink highly of consent searches:
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given 
a weight and dignity of its own.  Police officers act in full accord with the law 
when they ask citizens for consent.  It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to 
advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that 
understanding.  When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of 
coercion.
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
2Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 495 (1983); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968).
3Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973).
4See note 1, supra.  See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, ch. 4 (1981) (consent as 
the moral grounding for wealth-maximizing judicial decisionmaking).
5Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale L.J. 899, 900 (1994).  See DON HERZOG, HAPPY 
SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 215 (1989); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of 
Consent in the Moral and Political Visons of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 386 (1985); 
Richard A. Posner, Colloquy, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 
1431 (1986).  Herzog says that consent Aprovides perhaps the single most prevalent paradigm structuring our 
thinking about law, society, morality and politics.@ HERZOG, supra at 215.
4Aconsent@ the amorphous notion of Avoluntariness.@6  Hence the notion that voluntariness is the 
touchstone of consent-search jurisprudence.
Attacking the so-called Avoluntariness paradigm@ is somewhat of a sport among Fourth 
Amendment scholars.7  One commentator, for example, argues that the Supreme Court should 
Aofficially jettison[] the voluntariness standard@ to make room for a new Areasonableness@
paradigm.8  This new paradigm would eschew the false binary consideration of whether one has 
acted voluntarily or not and instead demand a presumably more straightforward, if not more 
honest, constitutional inquiry, one that asks, what may law enforcement reasonably do to fight 
crime?
I don=t intend here to endorse or quarrel with the virtues of adjudicating consent searches 
through a Areasonableness@ lens.  How one feels about that approach depends in large measure on 
what demands for precision we insist upon in constitutional adjudication.  After all, A[t]here is no 
formula for the determination of reasonableness.  Each case is to be decided on its own facts and 
circumstances.@9  My purpose here is to expose the unrealistic expectations that plague some 
6Herzog, supra note 5, at 215; Robert A. Burt, Democracy, Equality, and the Death Penalty, XXXVI 
Nomos 80 (1994).  For an ancient but still influential investigation into the voluntary-involuntary distinction, see
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book III, ch. 1-4, 8.
7Ric Simmons, Not AVoluntary@ But Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent 
Search Doctrine, 80 Indiana L.J. 773, 775 , n. 9 (2005)  (citing articles critical of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
involving consent searches).
8Id. 
9Go-Bart Co. V. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).   The doctrinal mess that is Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence largely springs from the varied Amodels@ of reasonableness that the Supreme Court uses to adjudicate 
search-and-seizure issues.  Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment=s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 Utah L. 
Rev. 977, 978 (2004).  The problem is the Court=s inability to articulate a set of principles that coherently govern 
which particular model of reasonableness to use.  Clancy identifies five models to measure reasonableness: the 
warrant preference model, the individualized suspicion model, the totality of the circumstances test, the balancing 
test, and a hybrid model that gives dispositive weight to the common law.  Id.  Clancy contends that the ACourt has, 
5critiques of consent-search jurisprudence, and thus to sharpen our focus when assessing this 
problematic realm of Fourth Amendment law.  I endeavor to do this by showing why it is odd  to 
advocate a Anew paradigm@ for understanding so-called consent searches.
I.  WHAT IS CONSENT?
A. Encapsulating This Article by Exposing a Logical Fallacy
Let=s begin with a logician=s mindset.  Here is a simple syllogism:
I.  My house is blue.
II.   My house is a building.
III.  That building is blue.
Simple and logical.  Propositions I and II lead to the conclusion in III.  But compare that 
syllogism to these two:
I. A beetle is a large insect.
II.  An insect is an animal.
III.  A beetle is a large animal.
and
I.  P is a good carpenter.
II.  P is an American citizen.
III.  P is a good American citizen.
Not logical, both.  Propositions I and II, even though true, don=t justify the conclusion in III.  The 
reason these syllogisms don=t work, but the blue-house syllogism does, is that the adjectives 
from time to time, attempted to harmonize its analysis by announcing the primacyCor the demiseCof a particular 
model.@ Id. at 1021.  But, he rightly observes, A[n]one of those efforts has been enduring.@ Id.
6Alarge@ and Agood@ function differently than the adjective Ablue.@  How we understand Alarge@ and 
Agood@ depends on what it modifies.  But Ablue@ is blue:  we understand blue-ness noumenally, 
independent of what it modifies.
Now, consider this one:
I. D voluntarily consented to a search.
II.  Consent is an act of granting permission.
III.  D voluntarily granted permission to a search.
We are tempted to treat III as a logical outgrowth of propositions I and II.  And so, in a case 
where commonsense tells us that D did not in any meaningful sense voluntarily grant permission 
to the police to search her car, we might well work our way backwards through this syllogism to 
find that proposition I is false: no voluntary consent, and thus no legal search.  But this mode of 
thinking, superficially logical as it is, assumes that this syllogism is more like the blue-house 
syllogism than the large-insect and good-carpenter syllogisms.
What if we treat Avoluntarily@ the way we treat Alarge@ and Agood@ in the insect and 
carpenter syllogisms?  Then the truth of proposition I (D voluntarily consented) is not necessarily 
linked to the truth of proposition III (D voluntarily granted permission).  How we understand 
Avoluntarily@ depends on how we understand Aconsent@ beyond the minimalist understanding of 
consent as an act of granting permission.  The truth of proposition ICthat D voluntarily 
consentedCmay communicate what we accept in a particular police-civilian encounter; it may 
signify not just a brute description (like blue-ness), but an evaluation that implies approval.  
AVoluntary consent@ would thus be a value judgment from a pool of facts that depends on 
function.  AGood carpenter@ implies something crucial about the function of carpenters, and that 
7function has nothing to do with our judgment about what makes a good American citizen.10
AVoluntary consent,@ then, implies something about the function of consent, it=s function in a 
particular human encounter.  AGood carpenter@ is a meaningful statement of approval inasmuch 
as we have a vision of what a carpenter does.  AVoluntary consent@ is a meaningful statement of 
approval inasmuch as we have a vision of what a particular encounter should be like.
We should nail down three observations.  One, Agood@ and Avoluntary@ are words of 
commendation, of approval; they cannot be taken as things in themselves, nor as qualities in 
some noumenal realm.  Two, when we agree on the facts but dispute whether a particular 
carpenter is a good one, or whether a particular encounter was consensual, we experience a clash 
of visionsCvisions over what carpenters do or over how we expect certain interactions to 
transpire.11  Three, what is Agood@ and what is Avoluntary@ are constructions built from the very 
things they modify.  These terms are not just plucked out of our heads to enhance the meaning of 
a statement concerning carpentry or consent.  The meanings of these descriptive words, which of 
course do serve to enhance the meaning of the respective statements about carpentry and consent, 
are themselves garnered by our understanding of what we mean by carpentry and consent.  This 
third observation is actually an extension of the secondCnamely, that vision informs meaning, 
and that we cannot discuss such things as Agoodness@ or Avoluntariness@ without reference to 
what it is we are after.
10The logical fallacy discussed in the text is not limited to functional referents like Acarpenters@ or Alawyers@
or Afootball players.@  I=ve included the insect syllogism to show this. ALarge insect@ has meaning insofar as we all 
have experienced insects and agree that in an absolute sense they are small animals.  The fallacy in the insect 
syllogism does not depend on some understanding of the function of insects.  Just as our understanding of insects is 
hardly exhausted by our recognition that they are animals, so too with consent:  that concept is hardly exhausted by 
our recognition that an act of consent grants some sort of permission to another.
11See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 58-59 (2d ed. 1984).
8What follows amplifies on what I am suggesting by these syllogisms.  I contend that 
much of the scholarly angst over consent searches is misplaced because it arises from treating 
Avoluntariness@ as an independent concept (like blue-ness) that we attach to this thing called 
Aconsent.@  But consent in the Fourth Amendment context gets its meaning from our vision of 
what is defensible or worthwhile in a police-civilian encounter, and voluntariness as a statement 
of approbation simply reflects the correspondence between the observable facts (more precisely, 
the record evidence) and the vision that we seek to defend or pursue.
One way to conceptualize this critique is to interpret the scholarly angst that I describe 
here as a symptom of a misguided adherence to the fact-value distinction.  If we hold to that 
distinction, the incentive is to treat Avoluntariness@ as an assertion of fact, which is to say, more 
than a mere value-statement, more than a subjective assertion akin to an expression of taste.  This 
incentive derives from the understandable desire that Avoluntariness@ have some analytical 
traction, which it cannot have if it merely reflects subjective sentiments.  The implication of my 
discussion is that the fact-value distinction in this context is misleading, if not false.  It is 
impossible to treat an idea like Avoluntary consent@ as a purely factual statement, just as it is 
unpalatable to treat it as nothing more than an expression of opinion (i.e., as a value-statement 
only).  We can evaluate as true or false a state of affairs purporting to reflect a search conducted 
through voluntary consentCthat is to say, we can treat that evaluation as expressing a factCbut 
only by reference to value, which is to say, our vision of what we are willing to defend or pursue 
in a police-civilian encounter.12
12Cf. HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 127-47 (1981) (defending the collapse of the fact-
value distinction).
9B. Consent and Reasonableness
The thesis that Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence ought to move towards a new
paradigm of Areasonableness@ is odd.  To see why, consider the 1990 case of Illinois v. 
Rodriguez.13 Rodriguez is a third- party consent-search case.14  The police entered Rodriguez=s 
home while he was asleep.  AThey moved through the door into the living room, where they 
observed in plain view drug paraphernalia and containers filled with . . . cocaine.@15  The police 
then went into Rodriguez=s bedroom where he was sleeping and found in two open attache cases 
more cocaine.16  The police had neither an arrest nor a search warrant.17  What the police did 
have, so they thought, was consent.  Not Rodriguez=sCafter all, he was asleep; but the former 
girlrfiend=s.18  It was she, an alleged victim of a battery by Rodriguez, who unlocked the 
apartment door with a key she was not supposed to have and who ushered the officers inside.19
She didn=t live there; at best, she was Aan infrequent visitor.@20  Her name wasn=t on the lease and 
she didn=t contribute to the rent.21  Since Rodriguez, being asleep at the time, surely didn=t 
13497 U.S. 177 (1990).
14Although third-party consent search cases are relatively rare, they are doctrinally significant because of 
how their existence shapes the consent-search analysis.  The Court in Bustamonte, the watershed decision addressing 
what constitutes a valid consent to search, diverted its analysis away from notions of waiver because to do otherwise 
threatened the doctrinal integrity of third-party consent searches, which had already been sanctioned.  See 412 U.S. 
at 245-46.
15497 U.S.  at 180.
16Id.
17Id.
18Id. at 179.
19Id. at 180.
20Id.
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consent to the police entry, and his former girlfriend was, as the Court put it, Aobviously@ not 
empowered to grant the police permission to do so, the trial court suppressed the fruits of the 
search.22
Under any meaningful conception of Avoluntariness,@ the trial court=s suppression ruling is 
unassailable.  Rodriguez never Avoluntarily@ consented to the search and never Avoluntarily@
authorized his former girlfriend to consent to a search.  But is Avoluntariness@ even the point 
here?  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, began by noting that waivers of trial rights must be 
knowing and intelligent, a standard stretching back to Johnson v. Zerbst.23  There is a difference 
between Atrial rights that derive from the violation of constitutional guarantees,@ Scalia observed, 
and Athe nature of those constitutional guarantees themselves.@24  Rodriguez had a trial right to 
exclude evidence acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Having that trial right to 
litigate a Fourth Amendment claim meant that he could consent to the admission of that 
evidence, either openly or by failing to object.  That power of consent belonged only to him.  
Only he, with the guiding hand of counsel, could consent to dispense with his trial right to 
exclude illegally-seized evidence.  A third party could not consent to admission of that evidence 
on his behalf.  
But things are different when it comes to the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
21Id.
22Id.
23304 U.S. 458 (1938).  Johnson requires that waivers be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and instructs 
that courts Aindulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.@ Id. at 464 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted).
24497 U.S. at 183.
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outside of the courtroom.  The doctrine of third-party consent holds that another person with 
common authority over the premises or place to be searched may grant permission to search.25  A 
consent search, therefore, cannot be rooted in Avoluntariness@ or any other subjective mind-state; 
it can only be a law-enforcement tool, and as such, must be reasonably used.26  Hence, we get 
Scalia=s crucial point in the opinion: a defendant Ais assured by the Fourth Amendment . . . not 
that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search 
will occur that is >unreasonable.=@27  Because the scope of the right protected by the Fourth 
Amendment is governed by the concept of reasonableness, the police action that led to his arrest 
need only satisfy a standard of reasonableness, not some standard associated with the validity of 
consent.  The Court remanded the case because, even though reasonableness is precisely what the 
Fourth Amendment demands, Athe Appellate Court found it unnecessary to determine whether 
the officers reasonably believed that [the former girlfriend] had the authority to consent.@28
A[W]hat is at issue when a claim of apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free 
of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable searches has been 
violated.@29
25See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).  See 
generally Mary Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 
1593, 1649-50 (1987).
26One notable instance of law-enforcement misuse of that tool is Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), 
discussed at note 88, infra. 
27497 U.S. at 183.
28Id. at 189.
29Id. at 187.
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C. Consent and Waiver
Reasonableness is the touchstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, not 
voluntariness.30  There never was a time when reasonableness was not, in practice, if not in 
words, the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.  There never was an old paradigm.  And 
so there is no sensible way to say that there ought to be a new one.  What we hadCstill have, one 
might sayCwas sloppy locution.  
It is tempting to think that consent implies waiver and waiver calls for consent.  Some 
scholars build a critique of consent searches on this entwining of consent and waiver.31  When 
you consent to a search, the thinking goes, you waive your right to the protections afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment.32  Conversely, when you waive the right to invoke the Fourth Amendment, 
you are consenting to law enforcement activity that might otherwise be illegal.  This entwining of 
consent and waiver purports to be an analytic proposition, one that is true because of the very 
nature of things.  
Here is what is important about this conceptual move.  If waivers of constitutional rights 
30See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (AThe 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.@).  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment 
First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994).
31See Simmons, supra note 7; Thomas Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. 
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of 
Police Error, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1991); William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 
761, 778 (1989) (observing that critics of the Court=s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence misunderstand the role of 
waiver in constitutional adjudication); see also Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 278-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Curiously, 
Professor Stuntz adopts the Avoluntariness@ locution but recognizes that the inquiry focuses on police conduct: Athe 
voluntariness standard invites scrutiny not of the defendant=s choice to consent but instead of the police officer=s 
conduct.@  Stuntz, supra, at 787-88.  Exactly how a Avoluntariness@ inquiry permits that sort of focus, Stuntz doesn=t 
say.  It would seem more linguistically rational to assert that the consenting party=s voluntariness has a very minor 
role in the analysis.  I take Stuntz=s curious locution to reflect how wedded scholars are to the Avoluntariness 
paradigm@ as a rhetorical device.
32See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 235 (noting that Ait is said@ that a voluntary consent constitutes waiver of 
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must be knowing and intelligent to be valid,33 then welding consent to waiver prompts us to ask, 
how can we validate a consent to search without some indication, if not outright proof, of 
informed consent?34  Indeed, how is a consent to search voluntaryCand thus a valid waiver of a 
constitutional rightCwhen the consenting party knows that her consent will ineluctably lead to a 
reasonably thorough search, which in turn will result in the discovery of the contraband?  Aren=t 
all searches that produce contraband or damaging evidence presumptively, if not by definition, 
non-consenusal?  After all, people don=t usually facilitate their arrest by voluntarily waiving their 
constitutional rights.  And in the Rodriguez scenario, how can one party=s constitutional rights be 
waived by another party who does not, in fact, have authority to consent to a search?35
Essential to clear thinking here is detaching the two notions, consent and waiver.  It 
would seem that we must do this to make sense of third-party consent cases like Rodriguez.  We 
invite trouble when we conceptualize cases like Rodriguez as third parties waiving the 
constitutional rights of another, the actual target or victim of a search.  Rodriguez displays what 
clear thinking on the matter should reveal.  Consent has nothing to do with relinquishing a 
constitutional right, vicarious or otherwise, for the act of consenting (or, at least, the reasonable 
expression of consent) is itself an act that justifies.  It renders a state of affairs legitimate and 
Fourth Amendment rights)..
33See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
34This was the essence of Justice Marshall=s dissent in Bustamonte, where the Court disavowed requiring 
informed consent to validate a consensual search. 412 U.S. at 278-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35That is exactly the position Rodriguez took in presenting his case to the Supreme Court.  Professor Davies 
reports that ARodriguez=s attorneys had argued [the former girlfriend=s] >seeming consent= had no effect on 
Rodriguez=s right to privacy in his home under the Fourth Amendment because consent should be understood to 
operate as a waiver or release of a citizen=s own privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment; therefore, 
Rodriguez=s right could not be >vicariously waived= by [the former girlfriend].@  Davies, supra note 31, at 22.
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justifiable.  That means, in the case of a consensual search, that the police response to that act of 
consent is not unreasonable.  And since a search and seizure that is not unreasonable does not 
violate anyone=s constitutional rights, it would be wrong to understand consent as a waiver of any 
constitutional rights.  In other words, there is no waiver in such circumstances because there was 
nothing to waive.
Commentators nonetheless criticize the Court either for not staying faithful to a coherent, 
linguistically valid notion of waiver, or for spawning confusion by disregarding that which is 
supposedly central to the analysisCvoluntariness.36  The impulse is understandable to treat 
Avoluntariness@ seriously.  A voluntariness test posits the existence of a neutral way to assess a 
police-civilian encounterCneutral in the sense that the analysis transcends our momentary 
impulses and prejudices favoring or disfavoring certain police methods.  But once we detach 
consent from waiver, we can scrutinize the term consent unburdened by preconceptions we might 
harbor about what makes a waiver valid.  We liberate ourselves from the expectation that 
36Professor Davies, for example, asserts that, under a proper understanding of consent, Ait is axiomatic that 
the inquiry begins and ends with the question of whether a person who actually had authority to consent voluntarily
gave consent.@ Davies, supra note 31, at 11.  Davies doesn=t make clear in what sense he is using the term, 
Aconsent.@  The phrase, Aauthority to consent,@ suggests that the expression of granting permission is eligible for legal 
enforcement.  The phrase, Avoluntarily gave consent,@ suggests that the granting of permission must satisfy some set 
of conditions before a court will elevate what is eligible for legal enforcement into what will actually be enforced.  
What exactly those conditions are, Davies doesn=t say.  But what will become clear in this discussion is that the legal 
analysis comes down to a struggle over what conditions make an eligible expression of consent legally enforceable.  
It is singularly unhelpful to say that Avoluntariness@ is the analytical key to that struggle, for what we regard as 
Avoluntary@ depends upon what conditions justify the enforcement of an expression of consent; and what those 
conditions might be inevitably turns on normative judgments about what we expect from our law enforcement.  See
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 133, 
134-41 (2003) (arguing that Court=s consent-search jurisprudence reveals Court is Ablinking@ at reality); Janice 
Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 155 (2002)(noting 
the Aever-widening gap between Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence . . . and scientific findings about the 
psychology of compliance and consent . . . .@); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 211, 221 (Fall 2001/Winter 2002) (criticizing Court=s application of voluntariness test because Ait fails 
to acknowledge the simple truism that many people, if not most, will always feel coerced by police >requests= to 
search.@).
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voluntariness ought to have some analytical muscle, and thus don=t get so exercised by the fact 
that outcomes seem completely disconnected from whether the consent was indeed voluntary in 
some metaphysical sense.
So we have two options here.  We might understand consent to refer to a subjective 
condition, a psychological state of affairs whereby the person consenting is, in her own mind, 
voluntarily endorsing conduct of another, or acquiescing to it, and that conduct somehow affects 
her directly.  This is the understanding commentators typically embrace when critiquing consent-
search jurisprudence.37  Voluntariness in this sense refers to a person=s inner experience.  On this 
view of consent, the person=s inner experience is what gives consent its moral force.  Consent has 
moral force because it expresses one=s will.  To will is to endeavor to bring about something one 
desires, to have a conscious aim and objective to pursue some end.  Consent-as-willing simply 
cannot be reconciled with consent-search jurisprudence, for, as we=ve seen, offenders do not will
their own undoing when they Aconsent@ to a search.  The consent-as-willing idea thus invites the 
angst that plagues most of the criticism directed at consent-search jurisprudence.
But let=s consider the other conceptual option.  We might understand consent not as an 
expression of will, a subjective condition, but as an act, an expressive act, one that brings about a 
legal relationship that defines the boundaries, the acceptable limits, of a particular encounter 
between or among individuals.  Consent, on this latter understanding, is an act of granting 
permission, and as such, it need not be an expression that accurately mirrors the person=s 
psychological state.  We could, as a policy matter, insist upon a tight correspondence between 
expression and inner mental state, but there is nothing intrinsic in or essential about the concept 
37See note 36, supra.
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of consent that demands it.  All that the act of consenting must do, at minimum, is purport to 
mirror some aspect of the person=s psychological state.  Consent understood as an act requires 
almost nothing from the concept of voluntariness, other than as some imprecise injunction 
against compulsion.
Which conceptualization best fits the Fourth Amendment?
D.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte and the Myth of the Voluntary
We can approach the question directly by consulting what most criminal-law practitioners 
and commentators would regard as the leading case on the issue, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.38
Bustamonte argued that the search of a car in which he and five others were riding violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the police officer said nothing before securing permission to search 
about the indisputable right of the occupants to withhold consent.  Informed consent, the
argument posits with commonsensical force, produces Avoluntary@ consent; ignorance doesn=t.  
Surprisingly, given how the case turned out, Justice Stewart didn=t disavow the framing of the 
issue in voluntariness terms.  Quite the contrary, he insisted on understanding valid consent to 
mean voluntary consent:  AThe precise question in this case is what must the state prove to 
demonstrate that a consent was >voluntarily= given.@39  That rhetorical maneuver could lead a 
casual reader to believe that a Avoluntariness@ test is at work.  After all, Stewart was quick to 
establish that the Avoluntariness@ inquiry in the due-process confession contextCbecause it 
provided the Amost extensive judicial exposition of the meaning@ of the termCwould provide the 
38412 U.S. 218.
39Id. at 223.
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analytical scaffolding for the task at hand.40  But what he drew from that murky and unsatisfying 
body of precedent was nothing more than the prosaic command that a judicial evaluation of a 
consent to search must incorporate Athe totality of all the surrounding circumstances.@41
This totality-of-the-circumstances locution, by itself, tells us little about the 
commonalities or differences in how courts should approach the supposed voluntariness question 
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts.  Justice Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut42
advocated an analytical approach that embraced all the surrounding circumstances to spotlight 
the inner experience of the confessant.  Culombe is intriguing precisely because Frankfurter 
genuinely attempts to grapple with the metaphysics of a voluntary and freely given confession.  
But Justice Stewart clearly did not regard the totality-of-the-circumstances approach in the 
Fourth Amendment context to function in that deep, metaphysical way.  At most, subjective 
considerations are merely evidentiary in nature.  They may help capture the quality of the 
consenting actCand surely, awareness of the right to withhold consent enhances the quality of the 
consenting actCbut they are not the sine qua non of enforceable consent.43  That must be so, 
Stewart reasons in Bustamonte, because what is Avoluntary@ is a matter determined by the type 
and amount of coercion or duress or other pressure that the government may validly apply.44
With that observation Stewart is able to conceptualize Avoluntariness@ as the crucible in which 
40Id.
41Id. at 226.
42367 U.S.568 (1961).
43Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226
44Id. at 224-29.
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Atwo competing concerns must be accommodated@Cthe government=s need to search and the 
individual=s incontrovertible right to be free from intolerable coercion.45  So, Avoluntariness@ does 
nothing else but Areflect[] a fair accommodation@ of these two considerations, which is just verbal 
gymnastics to say that Avoluntariness@ is a label pinned on a so-called consent search that strikes 
a judicial officer as Areasonable.@46  A Afair accommodation@ of the government=s crime-fighting 
needs and the individual=s privacy rights, Stewart concludes, compels the holding that 
Avoluntariness@ in the Fourth Amendment context does not call for informed consent, or any 
other legally-enforced ritual to cleanse from the granting of permission to search the taint of law-
enforcement coercion.47  After all, Stewart observes, Athe nature of a person=s subjective 
understanding@ is too recondite and inaccessible to courtroom proof to be a key ingredient in that 
consent analysis.48  Justice O=Connor echoes this observation in the confession context when she 
remarks, A[i]t is difficult to tell with certainty what motivates a suspect to speak.@49
Why the departure in the search-and-seizure context from the early Frankfurterish 
juridical fastidiousness, obsession even, over voluntariness in the confession context?  Why in 
45Id. at 227.
46Id.
47Justice Stewart seemingly understood well that informed consent puts the focus on the citizen and tends to 
shift the focus away from the conduct of law enforcement.  Cf. Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some 
Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 Yale L. J. 683, 690-91 
(1975) (informed consent Aemphasize[s] a patient=s or subject=s actual state of mind, knowledge or understanding . . . 
rather than . . . the conduct required of the therapist or experimenter@).
48412 U.S. at 234.  See also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (police not required to inform 
detainee he is Afree to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary@).  Justice Marshall, dissenting in 
Bustamonte, understood consent as Aa mechanism by which substantive requirements, otherwise applicable, are 
avoided.@  412 U.S. at 282.  No doubt this is true, but that fact about how consent functions does not imply that 
consent must be understood or analytically deployed in terms of waiver principles.
49Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985).
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the Fourth Amendment context is there the rhetorically approving nod but back-handed swipe at 
this seemingly crucial aspect of Anglo-American jurisprudence when so much angst has plagued 
the Court over that very same term in the confession context?  The answer, of course, is that the 
angst would be misplaced.  We worry about the false confession, a palpable reality that, 
whenever revealed, rocks the foundations of the adjudicatory enterprise and satirizes the law=s 
authority as the purveyor of justice.  No innocent suspect freely and voluntarily confesses to a 
crime.  The false confession is a testament to the reality of the distinction between the voluntary 
and the involuntary.  And so we worry about why one confesses, worry in a way that would be 
peculiar in the search-and-seizure context.  
Peculiar, because the discourse of truth or falsity when a search produces incriminating 
evidence would amount to a category mistake.  To be sure, the litigation of a Fourth Amendment 
claim often depends on credibility and reliability judgments.  But the act of granting permission 
to search implicates nothing about truth, or about reliabilityCthe act itself is the nub of it.  Not so 
the act of confessing.  The confessional act only begins the matter; it brings about the crucial 
issue whether that act has produced a reliable account of an event.  The act of granting 
permission to search thus arouses far less concern over motivation than does the act of 
confessing, where the motivation to do that which is ostensibly self-destructive (at least 
immediately so, and materially so) is a matter of both fascination and juridical concern.  All this, 
if nothing else, reduces in the Fourth Amendment context the urgency of the distinction between 
the voluntary and the involuntary.
There=s more to it, though.  In either context, the search-and-seizure or the interrogation 
scenario, the authority of the State pressed into action by the gun-wielding, badge-toting law-
20
enforcement officer works its way into the encounter, usually through nothing more than a 
psychological advantage.  And the undeniable aspiration is to subjugate the individual=s will to 
that of the sovereign bent on detecting or preventing crime.  But consent searches operate on the 
premise that criminals are not entitled to conceal that which would lead to their undoing.  The 
entitlement belongs to the sovereign; it is the sovereign that is entitled to the evidence bearing on 
guilt, unearthed either by subpoena, judicial warrant, police action predicated on reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, or mere acquiescence couched in terms of Aconsent.@  More muted is 
this supposed sense of sovereign entitlement when it comes to confessions, evidence that exists 
within the recesses of consciousness or even embedded in the soul itself.  A government 
justifying itself through the morality of freedom and human dignity cannot so cavalierly adopt a 
unitary doctrine of consent, one equally valid in the search-and-seizure context and the 
confession context.  For the former raises no compelling specter of government rendering 
helpless and hopelessCreducing to abjectnessCan individual who in that abject moment becomes 
the Awilled@ instrument of his own defeat.
Justice Frankfurter was the most eloquent and expansive in openly declaring the law=s 
angst over this deployment of State power to reach into the individual=s soul to Asuction@ out a 
confession,50 and Chief Justice Warren, dubious over the ability to detect the blurred 
voluntariness-involuntariness line, was the most forthright in his aim to do something about the 
omnipresence of compulsion in any custodial interrogation.51  The Miranda warnings are, in 
effect, a device to ensure that individuals swept into the custodial-interrogation process learn of 
50Culombe, 367 U.S. at 576.
51Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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their power to withhold consent, for that power allows interrogated individuals some measure of 
control over the flow and intensity of the questioning.  Precisely that awareness of the power to 
control the flow and intensity of a police-civilian street encounter is rebuffed in Bustamonte.  
That power is there, the power to withhold consent to a search, but the search-target=s 
disadvantages of ignorance and fear and resignation are accepted as vulnerabilities we expect law 
enforcement to exploit to good effect.  However much we speak of the Fourth Amendment as a 
guarantor of privacy, it never has and never will attain the stature of the Fifth Amendment=s 
barrier to the State=s desire to invade the most sacred realm of all, the individual soul. 
Confessions, not physical evidence, have that quality of being intricated in the human soul, 
which is why we speak of confessions with the imagery of bearing one=s soul.
The penetration into the soul to transform the criminal self into the confessing self is the 
stuff of terrific angst.  What contraband may be hidden in a car trunk could never, and perhaps 
ought never, compete with that.  Hence, the conceptual demands we place on the distinction 
between the voluntary and the involuntary must perforce be greater in the confession context than 
in the search-and-seizure context.  And even in that former context, the morass of psychological 
and philosophical ambiguity and conceptual imprecision so threatens to drown the judicial 
impulse to use practical reasoning to aid law enforcement that the distinction often becomes even 
there vacuous rhetoric, just as it is in the search-and-seizure context.
We need only look to such cases as Oregon v. Elstadt52 and Colorado v. Connelly53 to see 
52470 U.S. 298.  In Elstad, the suspect was questioned at his home about a burglary.  He gave an 
incriminating answer.  That answer was inadmissible at trial because no Miranda warnings preceded it.  But there 
was a later admission, one far more detailed.  That later statement was given at the police station, after Miranda
warnings.  The Court held that the earlier Miranda violation did not taint the later statement given after proper 
Miranda warnings had been issued.  Id. at 318.
22
that this is soCthat Miranda, whatever the original understanding might have been, is not about 
vindicating voluntariness or free will itself, but about bringing into existence the power to 
withhold consent in a police-civilian encounter by mandating the suspect=s awareness of that 
power.  Treating Miranda as a tool to modulate the interrogation process is not to affirm the 
existence of voluntariness and free choice.  In fact, treating Miranda that way reflects the 
opposite; it reflects the ephemeral quality of Avoluntariness@ and Afree will@ because it puts into 
the hands of the interrogated subject the power to draw his or her own voluntariness-
involuntariness line.  That is why, in my view, the so-called Avoluntariness paradigm@ is, in all 
criminal-law contexts, just the locution of a default position by rhetoricians whose job it is to 
prop up the fragile moral infrastructure of our criminal-justice enterprise.  And so, in Elstadt54
and Connelly,55 just to point to two notable examples, the power to withhold consent was deemed 
to have been undiminished, fully respected by law enforcement, even though in both cases there 
existed an undeniable psychological impetus to disgorge incriminating information.  The Court, 
shoving aside the psychological dimensions of these cases, underscored that the abstract 
awareness of the power to withhold consent was all that mattered, and that awareness was 
injected into the encounters through properly given Miranda warnings.  That meant for analytical 
purposes that Elstadt=s and Connelly=s volition were intactCmaybe not fully functioning (at least 
in Connelly=s case), but intact nonetheless by the sheer force of the nature of things, by the 
53479 U.S. 157 (1986).  In Connelly, the defendant traveled from Boston to Colorado to confess to a killing 
because God told him he must.  That psychological impetus to confess, brought on by a mental illness (akin to an 
alien compulsive force, an uncontested by the government), was irrelevant to the Avoluntariness@ question because it 
implicated nothing about the police conduct in procuring the confession.  Id. at 170.
54470 U.S. 298.
55479 U.S. 157.
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posited reality that volition exists until and unless government affirmatively acts to strip the 
suspect of it. 
II. The Power to Withhold Consent
Let us now widen our inquiry for the moment, beyond so-called consent-search cases.  I 
suggest this because, though not forcefully phrased in these terms, much of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence partakes in the study of the power to withhold consent and the concomitant power 
to consent.  By widening our inquiry we might see that, had the Court in Bustamonte tried to 
imbue the notion of voluntariness with any meaningful substanceChad Justice Stewart embarked 
on the metaphysically laden project Justice Frankfurter pursued in CulombeCit would have laid 
the groundwork to destroy the entire Fourth Amendment edifice.
To begin with, the power to withhold consent, in the present-day Fourth Amendment 
locution, derives from one=s Areasonable expectation of privacy,@ the well-known formulation by 
Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States.56  Shutting the phone-booth door was Katz=s exercise of 
his power to withhold consent, the withholding of consent to have others, especially the 
government, listen in on his conversation.  When Dollree Mapp argued for the exclusionary rule, 
she was demanding that the judicial system vindicate her power of non-consent, her power to say 
no to the law-enforcement officers who insisted on searching her home.57  The Supreme Court 
ruled that the proper vindication of that power to withhold consent, when the government 
improperly overrides it, is the evidentiary exclusion of the seized evidence.58  When Officer 
56389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967).
57Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58Id. at 660.
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McFadden approached Terry and his two companions and conducted a pat-down search, the 
Court said the thirty-nine year police veteran had the authority to take away their power to 
withhold consent because reasonable suspicion existed that criminal activity was afoot.59
What, then, is a valid search?  What is a valid seizure?  One might put it in consent terms, 
that they are instances of government action against individuals who, because of some reliably 
observable set of circumstances, lost some measure of their power to withhold consent in a law-
enforcement encounter.  The issuance of a warrantCsearch or arrest warrantCis simply one 
notable instance where the individual has lost some measure of the power to withhold consent.  
The pat-down search justified by reasonable suspicion is but another.  How much of that power is 
lost in any particular circumstance depends, in large part, on the type and level of suspicion that 
law enforcement reasonably harbors.  When one has an undiminished power to withhold 
consentCsay, because law enforcement=s level of suspicion is too low, or because no important 
and valid public purpose is gained by diminishing that power to withhold consentCthe 
government presumably may not under the Fourth Amendment forcibly search or seize that 
individual or her belongings.
All this suggests that we might well think that consent searches are justified because they 
involve the individual=s free choice to not invoke the power to withhold consent.  Our power to 
withhold consent, which may diminish or disappear upon sufficiently high levels of suspicion, 
necessarily implies the power to grant consent.  No surprise, then, that the validity of consent as 
an act to justify a search often devolves into an inquiry over whether a Fourth Amendment 
59Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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seizure has occurred.60
The case of Florida v. Royer61 exemplifies this.  There, two detectives stopped Royer, 
traveling under an assumed name, from boarding a plane; he supposedly fit a drug-courier 
profile.62  They took Royer=s ticket and his driver=s license, questioned him, and then Aasked him 
to accompany them to a small room adjacent to the concourse.@63  The detectives also brought 
Royer=s two suitcases into the room.64  Royer unlocked one of the suitcases and gave detectives 
permission to pry open the other.65  Marijuana was in both suitcases.66  The Court nominally 
framed the case in consent terms, stating that permission to search must be Afreely and 
voluntarily given,@ but it quickly traversed into the land of Terry v. Ohio to determine whether 
Royer had been seized beyond what Terry permits.67  That is, the power to walk away from a 
police encounter creates the conditions for a freely and voluntarily given consent to search.  In 
response to Royer=s motion to suppress, the State argued that the detectives never impermissibly 
seized Royer68; put in our terms, the detectives never took away Royer=s power to withhold 
consent, and to the extent that they might have done so, they were justified.  The Court disagreed, 
60See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-05; Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991); Royer, 460 U.S. at 
501-07; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-59 (1980).
61Royer, 460 U.S. 491.
62Id. at 493-94.
63Id. at 494. 
64Id. at 494-95.
65Id. at 495
66Id.
67Id. at 497.
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citing among many reasons the fact that the detectives never told Royer he could leave the room 
and catch his plane, and that he was taken into a room that was hospitable to the law-enforcement 
goal of securing consent.69  So, the impermissible deprivation of Royer=s power to withhold 
consent invalidated his purported exercise of the power to consent.
A fractured Court came to the opposite conclusion in Mendenhall,70 another airport drug-
courier case, but the analytical methodology was the same.  Mendenhall was taken into a room, 
just as Royer was, after federal agents identified her as a possible drug courier.71  She, too, was 
carrying false identification.72  The difference, though, was that Mendenhall never lost her power 
to withhold consentCno luggage was involved, her identification was returned to her, and she 
could have, according to Justice Stewart, Aend[ed] the conversation in the concourse [with the 
agents] and proceed[ed] on her way.@73  That meant her consent to go into a room and be 
searched and questioned further was enforceable against her.  Although the Court spoke of the 
consent as Avoluntary,@ no reader of the opinion can miss the fact that this conclusion only 
reflected the Court=s judgment that Mendenhall had never lost her power to withhold consent.  
68Id.
69Id. at 501-07.  This last facet of the Court=s analysis hearkens back to Miranda, where the Court spoke of 
the coercion arising from a situation where an Aindividual [is] swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, 
surrounded by antagonistic forces . . . .@ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 (1966).
70446 U.S. 544.
71Id. at 547-48.
72Id.
73Id. at 555.  Stewart and Rehnquist concluded that Mendenhall had not been seized when she was accosted 
on the airport concourse.  Three concurring justices thought the issue was extremely close (id. at 560 (Powell, J., 
concurring), and the four dissenters criticized the plurality for accepting a conclusion that no lower court in the case 
had accepted.  Id. at 567-69 (White, J., dissenting).
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Retaining that power to withhold consent, not some added metaphysical notion of voluntariness, 
made the consent enforceable.
The Court put an exclamation point on Mendenhall in the much-maligned case of United 
States v. Drayton,74 its second drug- and gun-interdiction case at a bus station.75  Drayton and his 
friend were sitting next to each other on a Greyhound bus when a police officer asked them for 
permission to search their luggage.76  The friend said, AGo ahead.@77  Because the two passengers 
were wearing baggy pants and heavy jackets in warm weather, the officer asked the friend Aif he 
had any weapons in his possession,@ followed by a request to search.78 ASure,@ the friend said.79
A pat-down search revealed drug packages taped to his thighs.80  Once the friend was removed 
from the bus, under arrest for carrying drugs, the officer asked Drayton for permission to 
search.81  Drayton lifted his hands, a gesture of consent, and drugs were found taped to his 
thighs.82  In what sense Drayton Avoluntarily@ agreed to suffer the same fate as his 
friendCsomething that he witnessed happening just seconds beforeCis impossible to articulate.  
74536 U.S. 194.
75In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, the Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge random 
searches in the cramped confines of a bus.  The coercive conduct of the police, not the oppressive environment in 
which the encounter takes place, the Court reasoned, is the analytical focus.  Id. at 436.
76536 U.S. at 198-99.
77Id. at 199.
78Id.
79Id.
80Id.
81Id.
82Id.
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And according to the Court, that psychological mystery (if mystery it is) is not a matter in need of 
unraveling.  To blast the Court for characterizing Drayton=s gesture of consent as voluntaryCwho 
can really say that it was?Cis to demand from the Court the conquering of a linguistic challenge 
it never set for itself.  What could be articulated and analyzed from the observable facts was not 
whether Drayton acted Avoluntarily,@ but whether he had ever lost the power to withhold consent.
 Not the awareness of it, but the existence of it by virtue of where the law enforcement officers 
(three of them) were positioned on the bus (the aisle was left open to allow people to step out) 
and what was communicated, with words and conduct (no threats, polite tone, no display of 
guns).83
Existence of the power to withhold consent?  In what sense can such a thing exist?  Is it 
possible to have that power when you don=t know you have it?  It=s a safe bet that if we asked 
Christopher Drayton he=d say, power? what power?  To Christopher Drayton, the awareness of 
the power to withhold consent produces the existence of that power; and the corollary is 
trueCunawareness means non-existence.  It=s hard to get around the metaphysical force of this 
entwining of awareness and existence.  But legal judgment is not metaphysics.  In the world of 
good guys and bad guys, the power of non-consent exists in the air, as a matter of atmospherics; 
it exists if the mythical reasonable innocent person would believe that this power exists.  And so, 
in Drayton, the existence of the power of non-consentCthe atmospheric existence, let us 
sayCvalidated as consensual what clearly was not, psychologically speaking, consensual at all:  a 
clear instance of expressive acquiescence trumping subjective unwillingness.84
83Id. at 203-04.
84Id. at 203-05.  No wonder Justice Ginsberg said the majority=s opinion had Aan air of unreality@ about it.  
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Yes, it is true that the Drayton reasonable-person standard may well cross the line into the 
circular and positivist idea that something exists because the law says it exists, and that existence 
then warrants the law=s deployment of it to validate the government=s actions.  But if we 
understand the reasonableness inquiry not strictly in terms of what a civilian might experience in 
a police encounter, but instead as an open-ended normative inquiry into what law enforcement 
methods we ought to treat as acceptable, we can break that circle and thereby expressly merge 
constitutional argument with political debate.85
* * *
The granting of consent to a particular police-civilian encounter which occurs against the 
backdrop of the power to withhold consent obviates the need for the police to garner some 
acceptable level of suspicion.  To say that this granting of consent is a Awaiver@ of the Fourth 
Amendment isn=t quite right,86  just as it isn=t quite right to say that consent is a form of 
Id. at 208 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
85Professor Nadler insists that consent-search jurisprudence requires that we ask how a Areasonable person@
would Afeel@ during a police-civilian encounter.  That inquiry, she insists, ought to be influenced by empirical 
findings regarding how people react to authority.  See Nadler, supra note 36, at 163.  But that approach assumes the 
Court=s reasonable-person test is actually centered on the inner experience of the target of the search, an assumption 
that fundamentally misconceives the Court=s approach to the Fourth Amendment.  If a Areasonable@ person not 
carrying drugs would feel free to say Ano@ to the police request for a search, then surely a person like Drayton, one 
with a heightened incentive to think Areasonably,@ would actually refuse the request.  Thus, to say that Drayton felt 
coerced (which is impossible to deny) but that a Areasonable@ person would not have felt coerced, is to say something 
that is completely absurd.  It is to say that the person with the most incentive to act Areasonably@ did the exact 
opposite.  So the analytical methodology undergirding Drayton belies Nadler=s premise that fourth amendment 
jurisprudence concerns itself with the inner experience of the search-target.
86Professor Davies contends that the consent-as-waiver idea animates such cases as Stoner v. California, 
376 U.S. 483 (1964), Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, and United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).  Davies, supra
note 31, at 29-35.  He=s mistaken.  Since I discuss Bustamonte and Matlock elsewhere in this article, I=ll confine my 
comments here to Stoner.  In Stoner, the police entered defendant=s motel room when the motel clerk, who was 
Amore than happy to give [the police] permission,@ opened the door.  376 U.S. at 485.  The analysis hinged not on 
any notion of waiver, but on these two propositions: (1) Stoner=s privacy in the motel room fell within the ambit of 
the Fourth Amendment (ANo less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house [citations 
omitted], a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
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surrendering our expectation of privacy.87  Like the power to withhold consent, it=s corollary, the 
power to consent, is a manifestation of a particular legal relationship that exists between the 
government and the individual during a particular encounter.  One can withhold consent and 
thereby force a police officer to retreat from an encounter and seek some other way to accomplish 
the search; or one can consent.  The legal relationship changes depending on which power is 
invoked.  That legal relationship is always governed by the Fourth Amendment, including the 
basic principle of Katz that a reasonable expectation of privacy defines what is meant by a search. 
 No less than when consent is withheldCa power derived from the Fourth AmendmentCgranting 
consent speaks directly to the reach and limits of the Fourth Amendment. The notion of waiver or 
the surrendering of one=s reasonable expectation of privacy suggests that the legal relationship 
resulting from the consent exists outside the Fourth Amendment=s purview, but that is simply not 
so.  How courts treat the withholding or granting of consent is itself an expression of, and is 
informed by, the scope of the Fourth Amendment=s protections.  It is in that sense that the 
exercise of one=s power to grant consentCbeing that it is a corollary of the power to withhold 
consentCderives from our reasonable expectation of privacy, and is therefore an exercise of, not 
a surrendering or waiving of, our rights under the Fourth Amendment.88
[citation omitted].); and (2) the police officers could not reasonably believe that a motel clerk had the authority, 
under these circumstances, to let them into his room, absent a warrant (AThat protection [against unreasonable 
searches and seizures] would disappear if it were left to depend upon the unfettered discretion of an employee of the 
hotel.@).  Id. at 490.  Davies misreads Stoner when he says that A[i]t is evident that Stoner stands squarely against any 
claim that mere >seeming consent= could legitimate a police intrusion into the privacy of a home.@ Davies, supra note 
33, at 30.  It may be true, as Davies points out, that Aonly a person whose own right is implicated can possess 
authority to consent,@ but that doesn=t undercut the understanding of the Fourth Amendment that holds that consent is 
not the linchpin to the analysis.  An ingredient in the analysis?  Yes.  Dispositive?  Not at all.  That is one message of 
Rodriguez, and Stoner does nothing to undercut it.
87See Davies, supra note 31, at 28 (Aconsent amounts to a citizen=s surrender of an expectation of privacy@).
88This conceptual point is distinct from the interpretive question of how much power to withhold consent 
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We still, even under this conceptualization of the Fourth Amendment, intuitively grab 
onto the idea that the granting of consent must be Avoluntary.@  Since the granting of consent is a 
corollary to the power to withhold consent, and thus an exercise of the Fourth Amendment=s 
protections, we understandably want to endow the granting of consent with some dignity, with 
some meaningful content.  Hence the urge to speak in the language of voluntariness.
But what about voluntariness and the power to withhold consent?  If voluntariness ought 
to matter when it comes to granting consent, then it surely must matter when it comes to 
withholding consent.  And yet it is hard, if not impossible, to treat the concept of voluntariness 
and consent seriously in the face of how the Court treats the power to withhold consent. 
First, recall the cases we discussed aboveCRoyer, Mendenhall, and Drayton.  These cases 
all involve the analytical dependency of the power to grant consent upon the existence (not the 
awareness) of the power to withhold consent.  What they show quite clearly is that the power to 
withhold consent is governed by objective considerations, particularly the observable conduct of 
the law-enforcement agents; the particulars of the search-target=s mental and emotional state are 
irrelevant, except in the very limited sense that such particulars might bring a different shade to 
how the Court reacts to the events leading up to the act of consent.  This objective approach to 
the power to withhold consent harmonizes with the objective inquiry associated with the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, an unsurprising fact, given that the scope of the power to 
withhold consent derives from the Katz test.
Second, consider Illinois v. Wardlow,89 where a youth standing on a street corner, imbued 
should the Fourth Amendment grant.
89528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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as a constitutional matter with his full power to withhold consent intact, saw a four-car police 
caravan and ran.90  Assuming he ran to avoid a police encounter, which is exactly how the 
pursuing officers saw the situation,91 Wardlow was doing nothing more than expressing non-
consent to any possible police-civilian encounter.  Perhaps the way he expressed his non-consent 
was unusual, or suspiciousCundoubtedly, a reasonable police officer would find flight at least 
somewhat suspicious or indicative of a guilty conscience.  But no matter how one regards the 
flight, the brute fact remains that running is both lawful and one way to express non-consent.  I 
want to repeat:  Wardlow undoubtedly had the power of non-consentChe=d done nothing to allow 
the police to seize him before he ran.  But the way he expressed his non-consent, the way he 
exercised his indisputable right to avoid a police-civilian encounter, in and of itself generated the 
justification for a Terry stop, a justification that did not otherwise exist.92  It doesn=t take a robust 
conception of consent to see that Wardlow treats the power of non-consentCthe essence to the 
legal notion of seizureCwith utter contempt.  Contempt, not with words, but with neglect.  The 
power of non-consent can be lost by how it is used.  The Court approved the exercise of the 
power of non-consent when it takes the form of staying put and remaining silent when a police 
officer approaches, or by verbalizing a Arefusal to cooperate,@93 or by ignoring the officer and 
Agoing about [your] business@94; but unprovoked flightCthat is an unacceptable exercise of that 
90Id. at 122.
91Id.
92Id. at 124-25.
93Id. at 125
94Id.
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power.  And so, reasonablenessCin this case, the officer=s reasonableness in interpreting 
Wardlow=s expression of non-consent as suspiciousCwas the real issue in the case, just as it was 
in the so-called consent cases of Bustamonte and Rodriguez.
We may lose our power to withhold consent on the flimsiest of grounds, with law 
enforcement taking that power from us with disreputable motivesCI have in mind, of course, 
Whren v. United States,95 where the Court countenanced pretextual traffic stops.  We may lose 
our power to withhold consent when the pursuit of other law-enforcement goals, such as 
immigration control, commands our allegianceChere, I have in mind INS v. Delgado, where 
immigration officials blocked the doors to a workplace during an investigative sweep.96  The 
Court emphasized that the employees= movements were restricted not by the governmentCthe 
immigration officials didn=t disrupt their work except for brief questioningCbut by their 
voluntary obligations to their employers.  The analytical focus was clearly not on the 
psychological stresses of the situation.  It had nothing to do with the inner lives of the workers.  It 
had to do with the conduct of the government agents and the perceived need to enforce 
immigration laws.  Reasonableness, again.
Consider finally those cases involving undercover informants.  The question in those 
cases could be put in consent terms:  whether the decision to speak to the government agent was 
consensual, even though the speaker was deceived into believing he was talking to a friend and 
not a government informant.  Framing the issue in consent terms works here because the power 
to withhold consent remained intactCwith one important caveat.  The power to withhold consent 
95517 U.S. 806.
96466 U.S. 210 (1984).
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associated with the Fourth Amendment does not include the right to be informed that the person 
with whom you are talking is, in fact, a government agentCan astounding notion, if not for the 
ubiquity of undercover operations these past many decades.97  Indeed, the government is entitled 
to deceive you into thinking that the person with whom you are talking is not a government 
agent.  That deception cannot be squared with a minimally viable understanding of voluntary 
consent.  If at all, that deception could only be squared with a valid understanding of acceptable 
police investigation.98   That the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the use of covert 
government agents thus reveals not the vibrancy of the risk-assumption theoryCthe conventional
understanding in this areaCbut the judgment that covert operations in crime-fighting is essential, 
and thus reasonable.99  The inner states of the search-targetCtheir being deceived, not just 
97See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1967); Lewis v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
98The Court suppresses the uninformed-consent aspect of undercover operations with the vacuous notion of 
assumption of the riskCnamely, that the aggrieved party has assumed the risk that a friend may not actually be a 
friend, but may be a government agent.  That risk-assumption rationalizationCand that is all it is, a 
rationalizationCbrings us back to consent searches.  The Supreme Court in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
suggested that third-party consent searches are justified on an assumption-of-the-risk theory.  The considerations that 
lead to the judgment that a target of a search has assumed the risk that another might consent to a search are precisely 
the sorts of considerations that one would consider in evaluating whether the law-enforcement conduct was not 
unreasonable.  Some have understood the assumption-of-the-risk theory to refer to the elimination of an expectation 
of privacy, much like when a suspect unwittingly invites a police-informant or undercover officer into the home and 
then speaks about matters that are highly incriminating.   This line of thinking leads to the conclusion that a consent 
search is not even a search at all for Fourth Amendment purposesCa rather tortuous and inadvisable way to speak 
about searches.  The risk-assumption theory is vacuous because any activity conducted where there is a societal 
judgment of no reasonable expectation of privacy necessarily entails an assumption of the risk that one=s conduct or 
words will be collected as evidence.  The risk-assumption theory adds nothing to the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy locution.  Indeed, conceptualizing the risk-assumption theory this way allows for a more honest critique of  
the Hoffa and White holdings.  Although we may not have a reasonable basis for expecting that our words will 
remain forever private and that Afriends@ will never betray us, the intrusion of a government information into one=s 
private realm could still be evaluated as unreasonable governmental activity.
99See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the 
Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137 (1987).  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE '8.1 (a)-(b) at 711 (3d ed. 1996) (deception to induce Aconsent@ is proper if deception is Afair@).
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uninformedCis completely beside the point,100 despite the clear loss of the power to withhold 
consent.101
III.  FAIR BARGAINING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
What does all this mean?  We can say for certain, as a doctrinal matter, that Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has never committed itselfCand after Katz could not have committed 
itselfCto a vision of consent as a subjective condition.  Believing that it does, or that it ought to, 
inevitably produces strawman attacks on the Court=s consent-search jurisprudence.  We should 
see by now that the Court never could, let alone never did, adopt a subjective approach to consent 
searches, that Avoluntariness@ never could be a meaningful concept, that the scholastic effort to 
take the voluntariness locution seriously takes our eye off the ball.  What we have seen is that 
consent searches analytically depend on the power to withhold consent, a matter that preoccupies 
most of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  To insist upon a subjective approach in the consent-
search arena, therefore, is to insist upon a subjective approach throughout most, if not all, of 
search-and-seizure law.  But once the Katz formulation is accepted, the power to withhold 
consent cannot be analyzed other than from an objective Areasonableness@ standpoint.  If it were 
otherwiseCif, that is, a particular suspect=s power to withhold consent must be evaluated in terms 
of a best-interest model (which an honest subjective approach must commit itself to)Cthen 
virtually all police encounters, as an empirical matter, would be deemed Aseizures@ for Fourth 
100That the emotional experience aroused by a government intrusion is not the focal point of the analysis can 
be seen by comparing the outcomes in Kyollo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), and California v. Greenwood, 
486 U.S. 35 (1988).  It=s a safe bet that most law-abiding people would regard the rummaging through of our garbage 
to be a far greater intrusion than the detection of heat emanating off of the walls of our home.
101Anthony G. Amsterdam recognized long ago that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focuses not on the 
personal rights of the individual but on the regulation of law enforcement.  Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 367 (1974).
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Amendment purposes.102  After all, what maddens us about the voluntariness locution in consent-
search cases is precisely the unreality of itChardly anyone would feel uncoerced in the sorts of 
police encounters that are described everyday in our courthouses.  And if almost all police 
encounters constitute Fourth Amendment Aseizures@Cthat is, the power to withhold consent is 
regarded as empirically and doctrinally nonexistentCthen the power to consent disappears as 
well.  It is pure naivete to think, and unfair to expect, that the Court had charted, or would ever 
chart, such a doctrinal path, one that strips law enforcement of the ability to seek consent to 
search without any predicate of suspicion.  And yet that is what is implied when we naively take 
the Avoluntariness paradigm@ seriously.
I say that it is not only naive but also unfair to expect that such a doctrinal path had been 
or would be pursued, because what drives this doctrinal and theoretical point, it is plain to see, is 
the inescapable realities of law enforcement.  Understanding consent as a subjective condition 
inexorably leads into fair-bargaining conceptionsCAvoluntariness with a vengeance,@ as Justice 
Harlan put it in his Miranda dissent 103Cwhere rights are relinquished for benefits received in 
return.  That is how criminal-defense lawyers in their advisory capacity would like to treat 
waivers, which is why they tell clients not to say a word when they are threatened with being 
taken into, or are already in, custody.  Rights are valuable and thus worth concessions in a 
102See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.  The Court explicitly rejected the subjectivist approach to evaluating the 
power to withhold consent:
Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a police 
officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.  So long as a 
reasonable person would feel free Ato disregard the police and go about is 
business,@ the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.
Id.
103384 U.S. at 505.
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bargaining process with the prosecutorial authorities.  But fair bargaining is exactly what an on-
the-field police-civilian encounter is not about.  If it were, then we would gravitate towards rules 
approaching something like an informed-consent doctrine.  We would take Johnson v. Zerbst104
out of the courtroom and have it set the ground rules whenever the police seek out evidence of 
criminality.  Trickery, pressure, coaxingCa whole host of tactics that exploit a palpable 
psychological power imbalance that favors law enforcementCwould be an anathema in this fair-
bargaining world, because the benchmark of legitimacy would be rational calculation.  Consent 
and waiver would be entwined insofar as consent would be legally valid so long as the 
concomitant waiver reflects a rational calculation that the waiving party=s interests are actually 
being advanced by the waiver.  In the Fourth Amendment arena, this rational calculation would 
minimally entail the civilian=s awareness that the police encounter could be ended merely upon 
her say-so.  Bustamonte makes explicit what the entirety of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
always has shown:  the fair-bargaining model, the idea of rational calculation in the algebra of 
consent, has no traction when it comes to search-and-seizure law.
And it ought not have traction, since the fair-bargaining model is absurd in the Fourth 
Amendment context.105  It is absurd because the police-civilian encounter primarily concerns 
evidence collection, crime-prevention, and crime solving; because it is entirely unnecessary to 
vindicate what we aspire for the Fourth Amendment; and because efforts to promote rational 
calculation in civilian-police encountersCeven if that were a value society wanted to 
104304 U.S. 458. 
105See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40 (1996); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).  That the fair-
bargaining model is inapt in the Fourth Amendment realm doesn=t mean Bustamonte is immune from criticism.  It 
may be more prudent to choose a social arrangement whereby police officers must warn citizens of their right to 
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promoteCwould be too messy to enforce.106  And so it would be absurd to treat consent as 
mandating considerations of a person=s psychological state and personal attributes that bear on 
subjective acquiescence to a search; such considerations are properly evidentiary in nature, 
suggestive but hardly dispositive of the true issue that is at stake when evaluating a Fourth 
Amendment consent scenario.  The true issue has never beenCand, as a realistic matter, could 
never beCvoluntariness; the true issue is and always has been the acceptability of law-
enforcement methods, the way that law enforcement secures the outward expression of 
consent.107
IV.  VOLUNTARINESS AND CHOICE
Consent is not valid if given only in acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority, such as 
when an official conducting the search misrepresents that he has a warrant or the possibility of 
getting one108; nor can consent justify a search if the search was conducted under a defective 
warrant.109  And, as we saw with Royer, if consent is given during an illegal seizure, it is 
invalid.110  These scenarios show that voluntariness, if it has any referential meaning at all, 
withhold consent.  That is not a conceptual issue; it=s a policy judgment.
106Miranda warnings can be given without any nuanced judgment on the part of law-enforcement officers.  
They read the rights from a card.  But that rote rendition of rights is not possible in an on-the-street encounter 
involving an effort to accomplish a search.  In situations where law enforcement does not yet have adequate grounds 
to conduct a search, a warning to a target of a search that she may refuse consent would be accurate.  But where law 
enforcement has enough information to secure a warrant, that warning would be misleading, since a right-to-refuse 
warning implies that consent is the only way the officer could accomplish the search.
107See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435 (police-civilian encounter consensual Aso long as the police do not convey a 
message that compliance with their requests is required@).
108Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49.
109Id. at 549.
110Royer, 460 U.S. at 501-08.
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signals the existence of an actual perceived choice to grant or withhold consent.  The whole 
overborne-will ideaCof limited relevance today, since physical brutality to extract Aconsensual@
disgorgement of evidence is far less prevalent today than in earlier timesCis nothing more than 
an acknowledgment that consent, at the very least, requires the existence of a choice.  Maybe not 
a palatable choice, and certainly not a choice unburdened by pressures and harsh consequences, 
but an actual choice nonetheless.111  And so, it would be wrong to understand Bumper v. North 
Carolina,112 for example, where consent was given after law-enforcement officers said they had a 
search warrant, as a case where voluntariness demands a certain quality in the decisionmaking 
process beyond the bare existence of a choice to grant or withhold consent.113
Once we get beyond those outlying situations where, by deed or words, the capacity for 
choosing has been severely eroded, we must understand voluntariness to be a word without a 
genuine referent.  It doesn=t actually mirror anything that exists in the real world.  There is no 
111The Aoverborne will@ is nicely captured in Justice Frankfurter=s description of the prisoner=s predicament 
while at the police station:
In the police station a prisoner is surrounded by known hostile forces.  He is
disoriented from the world he knows and in which he finds support.  He is 
subject to coercing impingments, undermining even if not obvious pressures of 
every variety.  In such an atmosphere, questioning that is long continued . . . 
inevitably suggests that the questioner has a right to, and expects, an answer.  
This is so, certainly, when the prisoner has never been told that he need not 
answer and when, because his commitment to custody seems to be at the will of 
his questioners, he has every reason to believe that he will be held and 
interrogated until he speaks.
Culombe, 367 U.S. at 575-76.
112391 U.S. 543.
113The Court spoke in terms of consent being valid only when Afreely and voluntarily given,@ but it is clear 
that the nonexistence of a realistic choiceCthe taking away of the power to withhold consentCis the critical feature of 
the decision.  391 U.S. at 550.  As the Court put it, A[w]hen a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a 
home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.@ Id.
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observable fact that we can call voluntary in the way that we can call a chair a chair.  
Voluntariness is not even a linguistic toolClet alone a misguided oneCthat frames the 
constitutional inquiry into whether government-engineered coercive influences are sufficiently 
great to say that the target of the search ought not take ownership of her expressive consent (i.e., 
the granting of permission to search).  Professor Simmons= so-called Avoluntariness paradigm@114
is nothing more than an offshoot of the criminal law=s embrace of the free-will ideaCnot as an 
empirically verifiable reality, mind you; for the criminal law accepts free will as if it 
exists115Cbut as a presupposition upon which to build the moral edifice of the criminal law.  And 
so, free will being the ephemera that it is, the notion of voluntariness could hardly be otherwise.
The conceptual key to understanding the jurisprudence of consent searches, therefore, is 
not the notion of voluntary waiver; that path leads to a quagmire of meaningless conceptual 
puzzles.  Rather, the key is understanding consent as an expressive idea, one that concerns itself 
with the outward signs of one party granting permission to another.116  Voluntariness is but a 
label we can place upon that observable phenomenonCin the Fourth Amendment context, an 
interaction that transpires between law enforcement and a private citizen who may but need not 
be a target of suspicion.117  We can see signs, physical and verbal, that indicate the granting or 
114Simmons, supra note 7, at 775.
115See, e.g., HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74 (1968).
116The Court=s treatment of the consent issue in Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, leaves no doubt that 
consent is best understood in the expressive sense, not the internal sense.  The issue in Jimino was the scope of the 
consent.  Jimeno argued that he consented to a car search but did not consent to the opening of a paper bag found 
during the search.  Id. at 249.  The Court upheld the search because Jimeno=s granting of permissionCwhat he 
expressedCgoverned the scope of the search, not Jimeno=s private intentionsCwhat he thought was the scope of the 
consent.  Id. at 251-52.
117Cf. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (seizure occurs if a Areasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave@).  Mendenhall=s objective test was endorsed only by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, but four years 
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withholding of permission to search.118  Like all observation, this one involves evaluation, 
normative considerations that, in the case of a contested search, lead us to judge the purported 
granting of permission as valid or invalid.  It is thus a mistake to posit that the Court purports to 
engage in some sort of metaphysical inquiry into voluntary consent.  The analytical focus is not 
the quality of the consent per se, but the police practice to override any resistance to giving that 
consentCa fact that characterizes both consent-search and Miranda jurisprudence.
It is thus pointless to lament that the Court never expends genuine effort to nail down 
some concrete understanding of voluntariness, beyond the brute necessity that some actual choice 
be presented to the supposed consenting party.  Fourth Amendment analysis as a purely 
intellectual exercise loses nothing if all references to voluntariness were excised.  Perhaps for 
clarity=s sake we would be better off unshackling ourselves from metaphysical terms like 
Avoluntariness.@   But, regardless of that, to say, that voluntariness defined the old paradigm is to 
pin on the Court a mode of analysis that it never actually embraced.  Metaphysical notions like 
voluntariness have always been mere lexical paraphernalia of the actual inquiry into police 
methods we accept as legitimate crime-fighting tools.  What happened in Bustamonte and all of 
the other consent-search cases is what happened in Rodriguez:  the Court evaluated a civilian-
police encounter and inquired into whether the crime-fighting methodology was minimally 
acceptable.  The Court might dress up the analysis with evocative metaphysical notions, but 
taking that language seriously only prevents one from seeing that the Court purports to do 
later commanded the support of the full Court.  See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210.
118The scope of a consent search may not exceed the scope of the consent given, and that scope is 
determined by asking how a reasonable person would have understood what was communicated between the 
consenting party and the searching party.  See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-51.
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nothing more, and nothing less, than assess reasonableness.119
Perhaps metaphysics lends elegance to the doctrine.  The evaluative judgment embedded 
within the reasonableness test reflects the inelegant fact that law enforcement is at war with 
criminals.  Law-enforcement officers look for evidence of crime; criminals try their best to 
conceal that evidence.  In this Acompetitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,@120 criminals have a 
decided preference not to consent to a search.  Law enforcement officers contrive ways to induce 
consent.  More often than not, the entire evaluative enterprise boils down to a nitty-gritty 
judgment about what kinds of coercion, what kinds of pressure and trickery and deceit, law 
enforcement may employ to get the criminal to grant what he does not want to grantCpermission 
to search.  Of course, the same goes for extracting damaging admissions and confessions.  
Coercive methods to get suspects to do what they do not want to do, incriminate themselves, are 
evaluated to arrive at a pragmatic judgment that is broadly framed by the language of the 
Constitution.121  It simply makes no sense to take Avoluntariness@ seriously when the purpose of 
119AReasonableness@ is not an empirical or psychological inquiry.  It should be understood normatively, as 
expressing what is legitimate or justifiable.  A person might be entirely reasonable in believing that her actions on a 
secluded beach in the middle of the night are unobserved.  But that hardly merits the claim that her illegal actions on 
that secluded beach, if observed by law enforcement, come within the protective umbrella of the Fourth Amendment. 
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).  Her actions occur in public.  Statistical likelihood of being 
observed might favor her psychological state of security that she is doing something Aprivate,@ but the normative 
judgment that activities on public lands are not Aprivate@ prevails in the constitutional analysis.  Empirical 
considerations might serve an evidentiary function in concluding that a subjective expectation of privacy was 
unwarranted.  So, one might believe that one=s trash or one=s backyard activities are private, but the realities of 
modern-day life could undercut the reasonableness of those subjective expectations.  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
120Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
121This focus on law-enforcement methods to sever a search target=s first- and second-order preferences 
explains why evidence may be suppressed upon a finding of invalid consent even though that evidence could have 
been acquired by some other legitimate means.  See Kyollo, 533 U.S. at 34, n.2 (AThe fact that equivalent 
information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the 
Fourth Amendment.@).
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an endeavor is to get offenders to do that which they do not want to do.
This exercise in evaluating the tug-of-war of crime-prevention and crime-solving reveals 
how the concept of consent can expand or contract.  If a police officer has probable cause to 
search but cannot contact a magistrate, a court could legitimately find consent on sparser 
evidence than in a situation where a police officer had nothing more than a hunch when eliciting 
the consent to search.  Similarly, a heavier burden to establish consent would be appropriately 
placed on the prosecution where the police officer could have obtained a warrant but did not, 
relying on consent instead.  Within the Fourth Amendment context there is nothing fixed about 
the concept of consent, because there, too, the concept is but a tool to extend or limit the reach of 
that constitutional right.122
Consent, then, is dynamic, not static.  It is a functional idea, not lexical.  It functions in 
the Fourth Amendment context to define the establishment of a legal relationship between a 
civilian target of a search and law enforcement.  Words of consent are not significant because of 
what they might say about a suspect=s psychological condition, or about the suspect=s cost-benefit 
analysis.  They are significant because of what those words do.123  Consent can empower the 
122When we enter this world, waiver ceases to take on the imagery of a relinquishment of a possession.  In 
the Fourth Amendment context, the target of the search is not so much relinquishing her possession of a right, but 
rather is foregoing the opportunity to trigger the enforcement of a right.  This conceptualization explains why 
consent is found in those cases where a person fails to object to a search.  See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 861 
F.2d 396, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667-70 (5th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Dunkley, 911 F.2d 522, 525-26 (11th 
Cir. 1990)(per curiam).
123Understanding consent in this functional wayCby what it does, not by what it presumably isCreveals why 
critics misfire when they lament that a lax consent-search doctrine betrays our commitment to ensuring that waivers 
are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  See Davies, supra note 31, at 11. Consent certainly does function to 
eliminate what otherwise might be a viable Fourth Amendment argument, just as a waiver would.  Simply because 
consent, in its operation, functions in the same way as a waiver would function does not mean that consent in a 
Fourth Amendment scenario must be evaluated under the same standards as a waiver in a courtroom scenario.
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civilian by, for example, facilitating travel in a post-9/11 age of security threats.  More often, 
consent empowers law enforcement: it is an act whereby the criminal suspect empowers the 
suspicious police officer to gain the upper hand in the law-enforcement struggle.  The 
Bustamonte Court understood consent in this way when it said that permission-granting ought to 
be encouraged, not discouraged.124
It is thus tempting to argue that consent-search jurisprudence resurrects the property-
based reasoning of Boyd v. United States,125 where the Court evaluated the propriety of a search 
or seizure in terms of who had a superior property interest in the thing to be searched or seized.  
That mode of reasoning is anachronistic, of course, having long given way to privacy-based 
reasoning.126  But consent searches don=t fit comfortably within a privacy-based notion of the 
Fourth Amendment, which may be one reason why there is so much academic angst over them.  
The huge advantage given to law enforcement in extracting Aconsent@ from a search target 
suggests an underlying view that the contraband that the police are endeavoring to uncover more 
properly belongs to society, with its superior interest in crime-detection, an interest that clearly 
trumps an offender=s interest in crime-avoidance.
IV. CONCLUSION
To treat consent as a waiver in a Fourth Amendment context produces judgmental 
pronouncements of hypocrisy.  How hypocritical it is, the criticism goes, to applaud the Fourth
124412 U.S. at 243.
125116 U.S. 616 (1886).
126See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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Amendment as a bulwark for privacy, and yet permit with such laxity the waiver of its 
enforcement.127  The conceptual flaw in this criticism, of course, rests with the fallacious 
equation of consent and waiver.  If consent is to be entwined with anything, it is not to be 
entwined with waiver, but rather, with a substantive vision of the Fourth Amendment itself.  
Because the function of consent is to define a legal relationship, and because the evaluative norm 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is and always has been reasonableness, the litigation of 
consent searches tests the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment itself.  A consent to search is not 
a waiver of the right to insist upon enforcement of the Fourth Amendment guarantees.  Foregoing 
a Fourth Amendment challenge in a courtroom would be such a waiver.  Saying that there has 
been a consent to search is saying something about a legal relationship between civilian and law 
enforcement whereby the search that ensues is itself not unreasonable.  Consent is tantamount to 
a waiver of the Fourth Amendment only if we understand the search to be a priori unreasonable. 
 But there is no a priori position we can take in a police-civilian encounter because it is the 
encounter itself that must be evaluated in order to say something meaningful about its Fourth 
Amendment implications and ramifications.  Waiver is, if anything, purely epiphenomenal, 
derivative of the finding of consent; and that finding of consent, in turn, speaks directly to the 
127See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 31, at 764.  This must mean, Professor Stuntz argues, that constitutional 
guarantees enshrined in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments exist to protect the innocent, not the guilty.  This is 
true, and trite.  I take Professor Stuntz=s point as an observation that hardly needs elaborate argumentation to justify.  
The constitutional rights flowing from these provisions reflect values and promote policies that define and shape our 
communal and private lives.  They don=t exist for the sake of those who breach community norms.  They don=t exist 
to make life difficult for law enforcement officers.  They often protect the guilty, and they often impede law 
enforcement; but their raison d=etre is to make life more worthy of living.  So, when a drug dealer moves to suppress 
the seizure of a cache of drugs, the drug dealer is seeking the protections of the Fourth Amendment in his capacity as 
a person living within a society that places certain limits on governmental activity.  To say that he is a proxy for us 
law-abiding citizens is a cute locution that merely captures the fact that society at large benefits in having Fourth 
Amendment guarantees in our Constitution, even though society does not benefit in letting the drug dealer evade 
criminal prosecution.
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reach and limits of the Fourth Amendment.
* * *
We can and should critique Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in terms of what sorts of 
law-enforcement methods are appropriate in a free and democratic society.  Such critiques mean 
we must defend judgments about how much government intrusion law-abiding people are willing 
to accept.128  Surely no one could rationally suggest that this judgment should take the point of 
view of the law-violator who wishes to keep information out of the hands of the government.129
Thus, drug-sniffing dogs in airports may be very intrusive to drug traffickers; but the intrusion is 
nil for business and vacation travelers.  Upholding such searches is, therefore, a defensible 
application of the Fourth Amendment.130  Drug- and weapons-interdiction programs of the sort at
issue in Drayton and Bostick are more controversial.  We can quarrel about the judgment there, 
from the point of view of legitimate bus travelers.131  We can and should concern ourselves about 
128To be more blunt about it, a proper understanding of consent brings into focus our collective judgment 
about how aggressively law enforcement may attack criminality, which is entirely appropriate, since Athe fourth 
amendment [is] . . . quintessentially a regulation of the police.@  Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 371 (1974).  See also Thomas Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 556 (1999) (Athe larger purpose for which the Framers adopted the text . . . [was] 
to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers@).  To move the analysis away from issues of subjective 
consent and focus instead on the conduct of the authorities hardly ought to be seen as a bad thing in itself.  Cf. 
Goldstein, supra note 47, at 686 (ALaw should establish standards of conduct for the authorities, not the citizen@).
129See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).  Cf.  William J. Stuntz, Privacy=s Problem and the Law 
of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1020 (1995) (arguing that the focus of the fourth amendment=s 
protections ought not be on Ainformational privacy,@ but rather on Aforce and coercion,@ as that would Abetter protect 
the interests most people value most highly@); Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1123, 1133 (1996) (AThe Constitution seeks to protect the innocent.  The guilty, in general, 
receive procedural protection only as an incidental and unavoidable byproduct of protecting the innocent . . . .@); 
Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy=s Problem, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1079, 1087 (1995) (arguing that 
the fourth amendment appropriately focuses on the harm of governmental Aviolence, disruption, and humiliation,@
and thus is concerned with preserving dignity, not information).
130See Place, 462 U.S. 696.
131Even on an objective standard, it is more than defensible to stake out the bright-line rule that the 
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the race and class implications of such interdiction programs.  But what we ought not quarrel 
over is whether the Aconsent@ of the defendant in Drayton was in some metaphysical sense, 
Avoluntary.@  If the interdiction program smacks of a police-state environment, and thus pollutes 
our culture in a way that is intolerable,132 in whole or in part because of its coercive nature, then 
announcing the judgment that the consent given is Ainvoluntary@ is legitimate.  The wording may 
be ill-advised, but the judgment itself might well not be.
And yet I hesitate to jettison altogether the rhetoric of voluntariness and free will, even 
though, as I have argued, these concepts refer to nothing actual.  I philosophically cannot quarrel 
that Fourth Amendment analysis would probably be more honest if we did so.  But I balk because 
I think there is value to the attitude these words evoke, a certain presumption, if you will, that 
government action must be justified with arguments beyond short-term law-enforcement 
necessity.  I don=t regard this as squishy sentimentalism.  I wonder what we might lose in making 
the entire Fourth Amendment adjudicatory enterprise turn strictly on Amodels of reasonableness.@
 If concepts, facts, and observations are interdependentCand they surely are, inasmuch as 
concepts come into being through observations and acquired facts, and concepts in turn permit 
effective observation and fact-acquisition133Cthen the concept of Avoluntariness@ can at the very 
least aid lawyers and judges as to what Afacts@ and Aobservations@ should count in the 
argumentation over whether a consent search is Areasonable.@  And, more abstractly, perhaps 
interdiction programs like those in Bostick and Drayton are constitutionally invalid, as the Florida Supreme Court 
did in Bostick.  State v. Bostick, 554 So.2d 1153, 1157 ( (Fla. 1989).
132Cf. Scott E. Sundby, AEveryman@ =s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government 
and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1754 (1994) (arguing that the Aanimating principle [of the fourth amendment] 
. . . is the idea of reciprocal government-citizen trust@).
133See PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 199, n. 10.
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there is value in the slippery debateCtacit as it usually isCover what vision of the Aperson@ we 
harbor and want to promote when we confront issues arising from a police-civilian encounter.  
Maybe the voluntariness rhetoric functions in that mysterious way, pricking us to ask, what 
image of the autonomous person do we endorse?
But all this doesn=t change the fact that the urge to go metaphysical in the way I=ve 
discussed it in this articleCthat is, to go beyond the attitudinal and to critique how police-civilian 
encounters are evaluated from that metaphysical vantage pointCshould still be avoided.134  That 
analytical orientation steers Fourth Amendment jurisprudence towards a frozen and stultifying 
discourse;  it suggests a fetishism for words without due regard for the real-world struggles that 
underlie constitutional litigation.135  It is an analytical orientation that faults the Supreme Court 
for an inability to tell us what it means to act with free will, for the upshot of taking the so-called 
Avoluntariness paradigm@ seriously is to indulge in the false belief that an act of free will can 
actually be identified.136  And so to critique Supreme Court jurisprudence in this way bespeaks a 
desire to avoid the unavoidableCa straightforward debate over the contested issue of how we 
want to live, of the relationship we want to have with our government, of how we want the 
government to regard us.  It would be better, for example, if we debate the scope of the consent-
search doctrine not with references to voluntariness, but with a real-world concern over whether 
134See West, supra note 5, at 425 (AIf we are motivationally complex, then we cannot delegate to any 
ambiguously motivated human act such as consent the task of moral legitimation.@).
135Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 
Yale L. J. 1, 74-76 (1997) (noting that the Athe legal system=s discussion of criminal defendants= rights has suffered 
from an air of unreality@ because we are more comfortable with abstractions than actual nitty-gritty practices).
136See generally Peter Westen, Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem of Free Will and 
Determinism, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 599 (2005).
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law enforcement has unwarranted latitude in how it approaches and interacts with certain 
segments of the American population.  If we get away from metaphysical talk, if we recognize 
Avoluntariness@ to be just a word without any true referent, at most an expression of an ethical 
attitude that colors the analysis, then we force ourselves to engage in a debate over these worthy 
contestable questions.137  I think the Court has long prompted us to debate the matter in these 
terms.  Terms that compel us to confront the democratic quandary of what price we are willing to 
pay for things that are hardly quantifiable.
137Cf. Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 
U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 465 (1984) (arguing for what author calls a Acommunity model@ of criminal justice that demands 
some willingness of individuals to sacrifice Asome liberty or privacy@ to facilitate effective law enforcement). 
